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Naval Supply Systems Command Global Logistics Support Ammunition 
(NAVSUP GLS AMMO) is considering an alteration of the current Navy ammunition 
stock positioning system. The purpose of this project is to analyze the cost and delivery 
performance risk associated with either centralizing the Navy’s ammunition stockpiles 
and positioning them at an inland Army depot or decentralizing the ammunition 
stockpiles and positioning them at coastal Navy facilities. A Monte-Carlo simulation 
model was developed to simulate expected cost and delivery performance risk using 
historical demand data and rates provided by NAVSUP GLS AMMO. These measures of 
risk enable NAVSUP GLS AMMO to determine the probability that the centralized or 
decentralized system will outperform the status quo system with regard to cost and 
delivery performance. 
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The management of Navy ammunition is unique in comparison to other repairable 
and consumable materials because of its hazardous and/or explosive nature. Ammunition 
stockpile management requires a high degree of control. There are organizations within 
the Department of Defense (DOD) to take on the responsibilities of procurement, 
stockpile management, storage, handling, and distribution to the end users. Although the 
Secretary of the Army is appointed as the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition 
(SMCA), the Navy has its own organization for the unique business practices involving 
naval ammunition (Department of Defense [DOD], 2008). 
This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of both the business 
processes of Navy retail ammunition management (as outlined by NAVSUP P-724, the 
publication for conventional ordnance stockpile management) and will describe the 
background, purpose, and research questions that are being addressed in this project. 
B. NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND AMMO BUSINESS 
PROCESSES 
NAVSUP refers to the management of ammunition inventory as “Ammunition 
Stockpile Management” and established the Naval Supply Systems Command Global 
Logistics Support Ammunition (NAVSUP GLS AMMO) as both the wholesale and retail 
stockpile manager for Navy-unique, in-service ammunition items (Naval Supply Systems 
[NAVSUP], 2015). Their responsibilities include acting as the ammunition support agent, 
coordinating fleet requirements, resolving issues, and controlling the distribution of 
ordnance (NAVSUP, 2015). Ammunition product lines are categorized under a 
cognizance (COG) code, along with other similar munitions. Table 1 displays the 
different COGs, the ammunition family that describes that COG, and the ammunition 
category or type that is a member of the ammunition family. 
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Table 1.   Ammunition Cognizance Symbol. 
COG Ammunition Family Ammunition Category/Type 
0T Marine Corps Ammunition Marine Corps Ground Ammunition 
2D Tomahawk Missile/Components Tomahawk Cruise Missiles 
2E Air Ammunition Bombs 
  Military Pyrotechnics 
  Underwater Sound Signals and Sonobuoys 
  
Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated 
Devices (CAD/PAD) 
  Aircraft Rockets 
  Miscellaneous Ammunition and Containers 
  Gun Ammunition, 20MM to 4 Inch 
  Decoys and Countermeasures 
    Bulk Explosives and Solid Propellants 
2T Surface/Underwater Ammunition Military Pyrotechnics 
  Military Chemicals 
  Demolition Explosives and Material 
  Miscellaneous Ammunition and Containers 
  Small Arms and Landing Force Ammunition 
  Gun Ammunition, 20MM to 4 Inch 
  Gun Ammunition, Over 4 Inch 
  Decoys and Countermeasures 
  
Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated 
Devices (CAD/PAD) 
  Bulk Explosives and Solid Propellants 
    Smokeless Powder 
4T Torpedoes and Components Torpedoes and Components 
6T Mines Underwater Mines 
6Z JSAABR Material USSOCOM Specialized Equipment 
8E 
Air/Surface Launched Missiles 
(NAVAIR) Air Launched Guided Missiles 
8S 
SUBROC Material/Mobile 
Submarine Simulator SUBROC Material/Mobile Submarine Simulator 
8T 
Surface Launched Missiles 
(NAVSEA) Surface Launched Guided Missiles 
8U Sonobuoys Sonobuoys 
Source: Navy Supply Systems Command. (2015). Conventional ordnance stockpile 
management policies and procedures (NAVSUP P-724) (pp. 1–2). (21 ed.). 
Mechanicsburg, PA: Author. 
Traditional inventory management consists of building stock levels that are 
demand based, often using an economic order quantity, reorder point, and a safety stock 
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as protection from demand and lead time variability. Because of the uniqueness of 
ammunition management, NAVSUP’s approach to building stock levels is program 
based; using programmed requirements called “load plans” (NAVSUP, 2015, pp. 1-3). 
Fundamentally, the load plan is a stock level that supports fleet requirements for 
both noncombat expenditure allocation and an activity’s operational allowance. Once the 
fleet requirements are identified and approved by Fleet Commands and Marine Forces 
Commands, ammunition stock points provide projected commitments for storage space 
requirements for the load plan. The stock positioning of ammunition to support the fleet 
requirements is also part of the load plan; thus creating a system where each activity is 
mapped to a single stock point in their geographic region. One stock point has many 
activities mapped to it, and one activity is mapped to one stock point. Under the Global 
Requirements Based Load Plan, the aggregate of all supported activities’ allowances 
mapped to a given stock point become that stock point’s load plan and stock level 
(NAVSUP, 2015). 
DOD Directive (DODD) 5160.65 assigned the Secretary of the Army as the 
SMCA (DOD, 2008). Retail stock points for Navy-retained munitions excluded from 
management by the SMCA, as outlined in DODD 5160.65, are stored in Navy facilities 
located on both the East and West Coasts. Munitions that are Navy assets, but are not 
excluded as outlined in DODD 5160.65, are stocked at inland Army depots managed by 
the Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC). Assets that are not excluded, however, may 
also be stocked at a Naval Munitions Command (NMC). 
Activities submit requisitions, or demand signals, for ammunition for either 
training or as a part of their operational allowance. The material release order (MRO) is 
typically sent to that activity’s mapped stock point, or assigned NMC, as a signal to issue 
the ammunition, but can also be released to another NMC in the event that the customer 
is afloat and is closer to an NMC that they are not assigned to. In a situation where there 
is a shortage at the nearest NMC, a transshipment, or site-to-site transfer, from a different 
NMC is executed to satisfy the requirement (NAVSUP, 2015). The ability of an NMC to 
satisfy a customer’s demand at the first level is measured as “first-pass effectiveness.” 
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Requisitions for ammunition are submitted by activities via the OIS-Retail/Retail 
Ordnance Logistics Management System (OIS-R/ROLMS) and received by a Logistics 
Management Specialist (LMS) using OIS-Worldwide (OIS-W) via an interface called the 
Defense Logistics Agency Transaction Service (DLATS). The activity indicates their 
required delivery date (RDD) in the requisition to notify the stock point of the date by 
which the ammunition is required to be delivered. Once the requisition is received by the 
LMS in OIS-W via the DLATS, it is verified and can either be returned, cancelled, 
modified, or released. If it is a valid requisition, it is released as an MRO to the 
appropriate stock point for issue. Once the MRO is received by the issuing stock point, 
the ammunition is pulled from inventory and prepared for shipment in time to meet the 
activity’s RDD. Oftentimes, the activity will requisition ammunition well in advance, 
providing the supply chain with adequate time to respond. 
C. BACKGROUND, SCOPE, AND PURPOSE 
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), set 
guidance for the management of material across the DOD through the release of DOD 
Instruction (DODI) 4140.01. The policy, as established by DODI 4140.01 with regard to 
the supply chain, is that “DOD [sic] materiel management shall operate as a high-
performing and agile supply chain responsive to customer requirements during peacetime 
and war while balancing risk and total cost” (DOD, 2011, p. 2). 
1. Background 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO is searching for opportunities to reduce the cost of the 
ammunition supply chain while not impairing its ability to provide reliable delivery of 
ordnance to its customers. They are interested in researching how stock positioning 
would have an impact on the cost and delivery performance of the supply chain. 
Stock positioning for the ammunition product lines vary. While some stock points 
are positioned close to customer demand at coastal facilities, others are positioned at 
inland Army depots that fall under the Army JMC. NAVSUP GLS AMMO is considering 
either a centralized or a decentralized stock positioning system. A centralized system is 
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characterized by the consolidation of all product lines into the centralized inland Army 
depots. A decentralized system is characterized by the removal of all product lines from 
the inland Army depots and positioning them at the various decentralized coastal Navy 
facilities. The performance attributes under consideration for either system are cost and 
delivery performance. 
2. Purpose of the Project 
The purpose of this project is to perform an analysis on the effect that stock 
positioning has on cost and delivery performance by determining the level of risk 
associated with switching from the status-quo system to either the centralized or 
decentralized system. 
This project addresses the following research questions: 
 How is delivery performance sensitive to the position of a stock point? 
 How is cost sensitive to the position of a stock point? 
 How do site-to-site transfers affect cost and delivery performance? 
The project can provide a framework for NAVSUP GLS AMMO to identify how 
stock positioning might affect the cost and delivery performance of its supply chain, and 
select the system that has the highest probability of satisfying the customer’s RDD, while 
minimizing the total cost. The analysis is supported by literature that describes the 
business practices in use by other organizations to determine stock positions, exploits the 
potential savings, and measures the delivery performance of the supply chain. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This project considers how stock positioning impacts the cost and delivery 
performance of the ammunition supply chain. Much of the open literature presents theory 
and working models to assist in the decision of where to position stock for optimal cost 
performance, but there is no single piece that incorporates expected delivery performance 
with that decision. The purpose of this chapter is to review literature that presents a 
framework for stock positioning decisions and delivery performance. 
B. STOCK POSITIONING 
Stock positioning decisions may be based on several attributes and involve an 
analysis of the trade-offs between the costs of transportation, inventory, and materiel 
handling. The decision to position stock close to customer demand may be made if the 
desired effect is to shorten customer wait time. This can result in multiple, decentralized 
locations holding like items and serving their own customers. While customer wait time 
may be lower, the cost of holding inventory is often higher than it would be if the stock 
was pooled and positioned centrally. Centralizing the stock can result in savings from a 
decrease in facilities, handling, and personnel, but result in an increase in shipping costs. 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO faces a stock positioning decision with the objective to minimize 
cost. 
Many articles present frameworks for modeling optimal supply system 
performance. Sherbrooke (1968) introduced a model he calls “METRIC.” METRIC is a 
mathematical model for use in a multiechelon supply chain that aids in the optimization, 
redistribution, and evaluation of the inventory control of a weapon-system line item 
demanded at multiple decentralized bases supported by a central depot (Sherbrooke, 
1968). While his model is able to provide a solution for the allocation of the stock 
 8
between bases, the goal of this model is not to find an optimal solution, but to simulate 
the resulting cost and delivery performance effect from reallocating stock. 
Peltz, Girandini, Robbins, and Boren (2008) analyzed global inventory 
management and stock positioning during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This was an effort to 
make a recommendation to the Army and the Defense Logistics Agency on how to best 
design their distribution system in a way that meets customer response needs at the 
lowest cost. They recommended positioning items with high recurring demand and low 
price-to-weight ratios closest to the end user to produce the greatest return on investment 
(Peltz, Girandini, Robbins, Boren, 2008). The opportunities that existed included a 
transportation cost reduction from the reduced use of strategic airlift for sustainment, and 
an improvement in customer wait time. NAVSUP GLS AMMO faces a similar decision 
of positioning the stock near or far from the customer; however, this project does not 
consider the lead time associated with replenishing stock because it is expected to be the 
same regardless of where it is positioned. 
Shahabi, Akbarinasaji, Unnikrishnan, and James developed a mathematical model 
to coordinate facility and inventory control for a multiechelon supply chain. They use 
commercial solvers for the network design problem to minimize the facility location, 
transportation, and inventory cost (Shahabi, Akbarinasaji, Unnikrishnan, 2013). 
Similarly, this project consists of developing a model of facility location and inventory 
costs. The authors, however, did not consider delivery performance as a contributing 
factor to facility location, as it is a feature included in this project’s model. 
Askin, Baffo, and Xia (2014) considered the problem of selecting a warehouse 
location in a multiechelon scenario, with facility, inventory, and transportation costs 
associated with the decision. The result of the study is a model that assists in determining 
the location and capacity of the storage facilities, the distribution routes, and the 
quantities of materials to stock at each echelon (Askin, Baffo, Xia, 2014). This project 
considers the transportation costs associated with the facility location as well as the cost 
to implement, or to relocate, the ammunition to the new facility. This project does not 
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consider the different routes of transportation, or the capacity of the mode of 
transportation. 
A decentralized system may include multiple stock points holding like items and 
serving their own customers. Because they may be holding like items, opportunities exist 
to share these items across sites and to conduct transshipments, rather than maintain a 
backorder. Oswald, Atkinson, and Ferrer (2015) indicated that inventory balancing 
among three Naval Air Station supply depots, through the effective use of lateral 
transshipments, can reduce the total costs system-wide when there are optimal business 
rules in place for control. The results of the analysis demonstrated that effective 
balancing through the continuous updating of an item’s reorder point and the 
redistribution of items that are in excess in some locations, while deficient in others, can 
produce cost savings that are not offset by the transshipment costs ( Oswald, Atkinson, 
Ferrer., 2015). NAVSUP GLS AMMO currently utilizes transshipments, called site-to-
site transfers, to satisfy shortages from an activity’s assigned NMC. This project does 
consider the costs associated with transshipments, but does not consider inventory 
balancing prior to demand. 
C. DELIVERY PERFORMANCE 
The ability of the ammunition supply chain to deliver on time, as required by the 
customer, is critical. Operational units go to great extents to synchronize resource 
planning with deployment timelines. In many cases, there may be a short window of 
opportunity for an activity to receive and upload materials dockside. In general, 
customers place a high value on delivery timeliness and reliability from their suppliers. 
Hanghøj (2015) examined supplier evaluation based on delivery performance and 
capability. He emphasized that supplier delivery performance is an important metric 
when choosing a supplier because it can affect a company’s competitive advantage 
(Hanghøj, 2015). This project evaluates delivery performance from the perspective of the 
supplier. NAVSUP GLS AMMO is concerned with the metric of delivery performance 
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because it enables warfighters to effectively plan major logistical evolutions and sustain 
operations without interruptions. 
Guiffrida, Jaber, and Rzepka (2008) proposed that delivery performance be 
quantified financially in order to evaluate its impact on the supply chain. Sopenberg, 
Land, and Gallman (2011) presented a framework for diagnosing delivery performance in 
make-to-order companies. In this project, delivery performance is evaluated by the ability 
of the system to meet the required delivery date of the customer based on historical data. 
This project does not seek to quantify the delivery performance in monetary terms. 
Rather, the simulated delivery performance is used as risk management information to 
ground future decision-making processes. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The literature suggests that stock positioning decisions are often driven by their 
cost-savings potential but neglects the effect that stock positioning may have on delivery 
performance. Some literature stresses the importance of delivery performance and offers 
methods to measure it. The analysis in this project simulates both the costs associated 
with repositioning the ammunition stockpile and the effect that it might have on the 
delivery performance of the supply chain. NAVSUP GLS AMMO may face a trade-off 
between cost and delivery performance with the decision if they decide to implement 




This chapter describes the overall goal of the model and how it shaped some of 
the decisions in the research process. It then discusses the process of collecting the 
demand variables and parameters and how that information was used to create 
distributions to support a Monte-Carlo simulation. This chapter concludes by describing 
how the rates were integrated into the model by walking through the step-by-step 
function of the model. 
B. DESIRED GOAL OF THE MODEL 
The goal of the model is to determine the cost and delivery performance risk 
when changing the stock positioning system of the ammunition supply chain. The model 
estimates two probabilities: (1) the probability of Navy’s operating costs increasing and 
(2) the probability of delivery performance degrading when the system is changed from 
the status quo. The status quo system is depicted in Figure 1 and represents how 
ammunition is currently stored throughout the Navy’s supply chain for ammunition that 
is not excluded by the DODD 5160.65. With the current system, some inventory is stored 
inland with the Army and some inventory is located closer to the customer, near the 
coast. The output of the model reveals the cost and delivery performance risk of 
converting to the following systems: 
 A centralized system: The Army stores all ammunition waiting to be 
requisitioned by Navy customers at an inland depot (see Figure 2). 
 A decentralized system: The Army sends the Navy’s entire inventory to the 
coastal NMCs after they acquire the ammunition from the manufacturer. 
The Army no longer stores Navy ammunition (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 1.  Depiction of the Status Quo System. 
 




Figure 3.  Depiction of the Decentralized System. 
 
 
This project is focused on three NMCs (East, Northwest, and West) and their 
function in supplying two specific COGs of ammunition (2E and 2T). It compares the 
cost and delivery performance under each system shown in Figures 2 and 3 to the status 
quo. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS AND RELEVANT METRICS 
This section describes each rate and measurement that was extracted from the data 
sourced from NAVSUP GLS AMMO. 
1. Determining the Time Frame of Data 
The model simulates the distribution of possible outcomes of one hypothetical 
year of supply chain operations while considering the wide spectrum of operational build-
ups and draw-downs that NAVSUP has to support. A simulated year would provide 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO flexible options when using the results for their tailored analysis. 
The model was developed using demand data from the last seven years because of the 
wide spectrum of operational requirements in that time frame. During that time, the 
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military experienced ramped-up requirements from the surge of operations in 
Afghanistan down to moderate-to-low demands, with minimal involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This project focuses on the Continental United States (CONUS) aspect of 
the Navy ammunition supply chain, capturing any residual effects that operational 
demands indirectly placed on the Navy’s CONUS supply chain. It is not the intention to 
identify the statistical correlation that war has on demand patterns in CONUS, but to 
include any effects on CONUS demands that might be in the data. 
2. Narrowing the Scope to Specific Cognizance Symbols 
For a COG to have met the initial criteria of suitability for this project, the total 
number of requisitions that each COG had sourced by the Army in the past seven years 
had be enough to provide an approximate delivery performance parameter within a 95% 
confidence level (α) with an error of estimation of 2% (B). A preliminary analysis 
revealed that not all eight COGs had a sufficient number of requisitions to statistically 
support strong distributions for both Army and Navy delivery performance. 
In using Equation 1 (Keller, 2009, p. 340), it was assumed that delivery 
performance, determined by the sourcing activity’s ability to successfully meet the 
requesting activity’s RDD, is binomial because RDD success can only have two 
outcomes: meeting or not meeting the RDD. Equation 1 was used to determine the 
minimum amount of Army-sourced requisitions (n) that a COG would have to contain in 
the seven years to be an eligible candidate for this analysis. The approximate Army 
population average RDD success rate for all-time was around 10% ( ˆ ) with a 2% Error 
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Table 2.   Total Requisitions for Each COG from 2008 to 2014. 
Source of Supply Percentages 
COG Grand Total Army Navy Army Navy 
2D 1,900 0 1,900 0% 100%
2E 16,719 5,211 11,508 31% 69%
2T 68,710 10,929 57,781 16% 84%
4T 4,598 20 4,578 0% 100%
6T 696 64 632 9% 91%
8E 2,882 450 2,432 16% 84%
8T 3,920 37 3,883 1% 99%
8U 1,705 446 1,259 26% 74%
 
As shown in Table 2 in the “Army” column of “Source of Supply,” 2E and 2T 
were the only COGs that exceed the 864 sample size needed to statistically reveal the 
delivery performance for the Army. If any other COGs were used in this analysis, it 
would have proven difficult to replicate the Army’s delivery performance; samples 
smaller than 864 would have predisposed the model to reveal overly optimistic or 
extremely disappointing delivery performance. It was decided that this project would 
focus only on COGs 2E and 2T. 
3. Selecting the Facilities to Study 
It was predetermined that the model would analyze the demand of NMCs from 
different regions. Initial research revealed that the Navy frequently used site-to-site 
transfers that would often span across CONUS. The model needed to capture the costs 
that occurred because of the geographical distance between facilities. The scope of this 
project does not involve finding the exact correlation between location and the outputs, 
but to verify whether or not stock positioning plays a significant role in cost. It was 
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decided that using one NMC from the West Coast, one from the East Coast and one from 
the northwest portion of CONUS would best represents all inter-NMC transactions. 
For the purpose of this project, NMCs are referred to by their regional location 
(i.e., NMC East, NMC West, and NMC NW) instead of using their actual names. This is 
a precaution to avoid revealing sensitive information about individual Navy units’ 
allocations and demand patterns, and to avoid inadvertently making it possible to 
extrapolate demand patterns for specific NMC customers. 
Two models were designed for this project—one for 2E and one for 2T—to 
demonstrate how the three NMCs vary in cost and delivery performance when the 
systems are altered. The ammunition supply facility in Crane, Indiana will act as the 
inland Army depot for this project because the majority of 2E and 2T ammunition 
supplied by the Army comes from that facility. 
4. Determining Demand Distribution for Naval Munitions Commands 
To estimate the cost to operate each system for one year, a Monte-Carlo 
simulation is used to generate demand data. A demand distribution for each GOG had to 
be input into the model to reflect actual supply chain behavior. The simulation quantifies 
(1) the amount of requisitions each NMC would process in a year and (2) the size of each 
requisition. This section describes how the demand distributions were determined for 
requisition quantity and tonnage. 
a. Determining the Distribution of Requisitions for Each Naval Munitions 
Command 
The data revealed the minimum, average, and maximum number of annual 
requisitions for each NMC and for each COG over seven years. A triangular distribution 
of demand for each COG was used to replicate the number of requisitions that each NMC 
might process in a hypothetical year. Using data from the last seven years ensures that the 
model realistically replicates historical demand conditions. As an example, Figure 4 
depicts the triangular distribution that represents the annual amount of 2E requisitions 
that were processed through NMC East from 2008 to 2014. 
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Figure 4.  Distribution of the Annual Amount of 2E Requisitions for NMC 
East, 2008 to 2014. 
 
The x-axis corresponds to the number of requisitions (minimum value is 327, the average 
is 500, and the maximum value is 696) and the y-value corresponds to the probability of 
occurrence.  
Based on data from the last seven years, NMC East processed, on average, 500 
requisitions a year for 2E. In its slowest year, it processed 327 requisitions and, in its 
busiest year, it processed 696 requisitions. When the model simulates how many 2E 
requisitions NMC East might process, it generates a random variable that ranges between 
327 and 696. The random variable, however, has a high probability (as shown by the 
peak of the triangle) of being around 500 requisitions and a low probability of being on 
the extreme ends of 327 or 696. 
The Monte-Carlo simulation uses triangular distributions for each COG to 
randomly generate the requisition quantities for each simulated year from each NMC. 
Table 3 depicts the statistical inputs from the data that were used to develop the triangular 
distributions for each NMC. 
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Table 3.   Inputs for the Annual Requisition Quantity Distributions. 
MIN AVG MAX 
2E 
NMC East 327 500 696 
NMC NW 174 337 698 
NMC West 105 164 191 
  
2T 
NMC East 895 1,205 1,746 
NMC NW 411 1,058 2,066 
NMC West 1015 1,217 1,422 
 
b. Determining the Distribution of Tonnage per Requisition 
After the model simulates the number of requisitions each NMC would process in 
a year, it randomly assigns the weight of each requisition in tons based on the historical 
distribution. Because the model assigns the source of supply for each requisition based on 
history, forcing each requisition to vary in weight facilitates realistic variability in how 
much weight each source provides annually. Using this method also captures the 
variability in costs to the NMCs as well, because each source of supply generates 
different handling and shipping rates for each ton of ammunition. 
Triangular distributions were used for the requisition tonnages for each COG and 
NMC over the last seven years. For simplicity, the requisitions were not segmented into 
separate years. All seven years of requisitions were analyzed from each NMC by COG 
and distributed into one triangular distribution using the minimum, average, and 
maximum values. Table 4 depicts the statistical inputs that determined the triangular 
distributions for the requisition tonnage of each NMC and COG. 
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Table 4.   Inputs for the Requisition Tonnage Distributions (Tons). 
MIN AVG MAX 
2E 
NMC East 0.001 16.350 543.202 
NMC NW 0.001 8.022 484.65 
NMC West 0.001 0.773 25.42 
  
2T 
NMC East 0.001 1.085 76.597 
NMC NW 0.001 0.865 54.066 
NMC West 0.001 0.967 15.35 
 
5. Determining the Source of Supply Distributions 
In the model, the source of supply distribution varies by system and location. The 
model determines the likelihood that each source of supply needs to fulfill a requisition in 
the status quo and it also determines the site-to-site source in the decentralized system 
when an order cannot be fulfilled by the resident stock. The source of supply distribution 
is based on how often each source was relied on over last seven years for each NMC. 
Under the decentralized system, it is assumed that 98% of orders would be sourced from 
the resident stock and no orders would be sourced by the Army—but the relative 
frequency with which each site-to-site source would be used is based on the historical 
source of supply distribution. Under the centralized system, all orders will be sourced by 
the Army. 
Before simulating how the source of supply distributions would be used in a 
centralized and decentralized system, it had to be determined how each NMC was 
sourced in the past seven years under the Status Quo. The three NMCs’ sourcing patterns 
for each of the seven years were analyzed and it was determined how often an NMC had 
its requisitions fulfilled from the following sources (using NMC West as an example): 
 Directly from the Army’s Inventory 
 First-pass effective from its resident stock 
 From another NMC in the same region/local site-to-site transfer 
 From an NMC in the northwest/NW site-to-site transfer 
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 From an NMC in the east/east site-to-site transfer 
 From an NMC in the southwest/SW site-to-site transfer 
It is important to note that from this point, NMCs in the southeast will be 
mentioned in this project, but only in the context of acting as a supplier for the NMCs in 
question. The southeast NMCs did not have sufficient data to be useful as test subjects, 
but they did act as sources of supply for the three subject NMCs on some occasions, so 
their utility could not be ignored. 
Table 5 shows how often each requisition was sourced from the Army for each 
COG on an annual basis. The complement percentage was used to determine how often 
the Navy sourced its own ammunition requisitions. The information in Table 5 was used 
to determine the minimum, average, and maximum statistics and to create triangular 
distributions for each NMC to enable the model to simulate how often the Army would 
source a requisition in the future. 
Table 5.   Annual Proportions Where the Army Was the Source of Supply. 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2E 
NMC EAST 22.02% 22.13% 22.69% 11.76% 25.44% 14.86% 24.76%
NMC NW 39.38% 28.18% 22.49% 15.65% 18.83% 13.22% 13.37%
NMC WEST 10.29% 13.38% 5.46% 8.38% 5.79% 22.76% 15.24%
        
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2T 
NMC EAST 8.37% 7.45% 9.81% 8.95% 11.13% 5.88% 20.67%
NMC NW 15.71% 13.34% 10.31% 6.35% 5.23% 9.25% 4.65%
NMC WEST 16.83% 25.50% 21.73% 8.80% 9.12% 12.91% 11.20%
 
Table 6 shows how often an NMC sourced its own requisitions from its resident 
inventory. The results were organized as the minimum, average, and maximum annual 




Table 6.   Statistics Used to Create Navy Resident-Sourced Distributions. 
  
MIN AVG MAX 
2E 
NMC EAST 83.97% 88.45% 91.43% 
NMC NW 77.01% 86.26% 96.94% 
NMC WEST 68.38% 76.61% 87.86% 
  
  
MIN AVG MAX 
2T 
NMC EAST 91.22% 94.70% 96.77% 
NMC NW 84.62% 88.21% 91.93% 
NMC WEST 75.90% 79.25% 83.68% 
 
Table 7 depicts the statistical information used to develop the 2E and 2T 
triangular distributions of intra-Navy site-to-site transfer sourced requisitions. The values 
are used in the model to allow it to determine from where a requisition will be sourced if 
it is determined to be not sourced by the Army or by the resident stock of the local NMC. 
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Table 7.   Statistical Information Used to Develop the Navy Site-to-Site 
Navy Source Distributions. 
2E 
NMC EAST MIN AVG MAX 
Local (East) Region Site-to-Site 76.74% 86.41% 95.83% 
NW Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.63% 2.33% 
West Site-to-Site 2.08% 12.96% 20.93% 
NMC NW MIN AVG MAX 
Local (NW) Region Site-to-Site 0.00% 6.88% 33.33% 
East Site-to-Site 0.00% 21.07% 66.67% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
West Site-to-Site 0.00% 72.05% 100.00% 
NMC WEST MIN AVG MAX 
Local (West) Region Site-to-Site 74.36% 84.46% 100.00% 
East Site-to-Site 0.00% 2.65% 7.69% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NW Site-to-Site 0.00% 12.88% 23.08% 
      
2T 
NMC EAST MIN AVG MAX 
Local (East) Region Site-to-Site 85.96% 94.55% 100.00% 
NW Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.90% 2.46% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 2.38% 4.88% 
West Site-to-Site 0.00% 2.17% 10.53% 
NMC NW MIN AVG MAX 
Local (NW) Region Site-to-Site 1.47% 7.96% 23.91% 
East Site-to-Site 0.77% 1.90% 2.61% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
West Site-to-Site 73.91% 90.15% 97.06% 
NMC WEST MIN AVG MAX 
Local (West) Region Site-to-Site 71.25% 80.53% 90.14% 
East Site-to-Site 0.00% 2.70% 8.75% 
SE Site-to-Site 0.00% 0.06% 0.44% 
NW Site-to-Site 9.79% 16.71% 24.71% 
 
6. Determining Shipping Distances for All Shipments 
A key assumption of the model is that the Army always procures and possesses 
the ammunition first. This means that the Army always has to ship ammunition to the 
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Navy in each system. The Navy does not have the option to get ammunition directly from 
the manufacturer. 
The delivery performance used in the model is influenced by the specific source 
and its associated historical performance. Distances alone did not seem to correlate to 
better or worse delivery performance in the Navy supply chain overall, so distances were 
used only to determine costs. 
The distances for shipments were measured in driving miles because most 
ammunition in the Navy is delivered by truck. The distances in the model do not simply 
represent the one-way distance between the source of supply and the receiving NMC; the 
input data is a little more nuanced than that. The mileage that was measured is the total 
distance that a specific lot of ammunition had to travel—starting from the Army facility 
in Indiana—before it got to the final NMC where it is received by a Navy customer. For 
example, if a batch of ammunition is delivered to NMC West as a site-to-site transfer 
from NMC East, the total assumed distance it would have traveled is the total distance 
from the Army depot in Crane, Indiana, to NMC East and then to NMC West. The full, 
systematic expenditures of site-to-site transfers must be captured because they represent 
stock not positioned where it is needed. 
One consideration that complicated shipping distances was that more than one 
Navy facility can be a possible source in each region. So, to capture this variability in the 
model, the mileage calculated for each NMC is not the exact mileage from one specific 
facility in the source region. The average distance that a shipment from a specific region 
would travel from the top two to three most active NMCs or Navy facilities in that region 
was calculated. It is rare that the same facility would source all interregional, site-to-site 
transfers every year. There are usually two to three activities that pitch in to supply 
ammunition to other regions. 
Factoring the average distance prevented the need to develop additional 
distributions and simulations that would determine what specific facility sourced a site-
to-site transfer. Table 8 depicts the driving distances used for each source region. The 
mileage is multiplied by the tonnage of the requisition to determine shipping costs. 
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Table 8.   Driving Distances (Miles) Used in Simulation Model. 
Source of Supply Driving Mileage Destination 





Army (Crane, Indiana) 671
Source of Supply Driving Mileage Destination 





Army (Crane, Indiana) 2,340
Source of Supply Driving Mileage Destination 





Army (Crane, Indiana) 2,071
 
7. Determining Required Delivery Date Success Rate Distributions 
Delivery performance is measured by the sourcing activity’s ability to 
successfully deliver a requisition on or prior to the requesting activity’s RDD. The RDD 
success rate is the ratio of successful deliveries for a given time period. To simulate the 
Army and Navy’s delivery performance for one year, each service’s historical RDD 
success rate over seven years was used. For the Navy, RDD success was separated into 
the following categories: (1) the proportion of times the Navy met the RDD when a 
requisition was sourced by the resident inventory of the local NMC and (2) the proportion 
of times RDD was met with site-to-site transfers. For the Army, the overall annual 
performance was used. The analysis resulted in the following three RDD success rate 
distributions for each NMC under both COGs: (1) the probability of RDD success for the 
Army overall; (2) the probability of Navy RDD success for requisitions sourced by local 
NMC inventories; and (3) the probability of Navy RDD success for site-to-site transfers. 
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RDD success was stated explicitly in the data provided by NAVSUP GLS. A 
column indicated—with a Yes or No entry—whether or not a requisition met the RDD. 
Table 9 depicts the statistical data that was used to develop the triangular RDD success 
rate distributions used by the model for all three NMCs and for both COGs. 
Table 9.   Statistical Information Used to Develop RDD Success Rate 
Distributions for 2T and 2E. 
2E 2T 
SOS Min Average Max SOS Min Average Max 
NMC 
EAST 
Resident 0.00% 0.55% 2.22% Resident 0.50% 1.48% 2.93%
All S2S 0.00% 4.32% 12.96% All S2S 0.00% 14.26% 44.44%
Army 2.60% 10.72% 39.81% Army 1.22% 19.20% 81.08%
    
NMC 
NW 
Resident 4.38% 9.88% 18.77% Resident 1.32% 5.55% 8.87%
All S2S 4.17% 8.96% 20.83% All S2S 2.66% 17.36% 61.42%
Army 0.00% 6.07% 11.11% Army 4.69% 14.99% 25.37%
    
NMC 
WEST 
Resident 0.66% 7.70% 13.18% Resident 0.93% 6.80% 16.28%
All S2S 7.69% 15.37% 22.64% All S2S 5.98% 12.09% 19.25%
Army 0.00% 11.69% 23.81% Army 6.25% 21.38% 53.13%
 
8. Information Not Included in the Data 
To build a model that has utility to NAVSUP GLS, some rates needed to be 
determined that were not available in the data provided. This section discusses the rates 
that were provided by NAVSUP GLS AMMO and the rates that were estimated. 
a. Handling Rates 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO provided the per-ton handling rates for the majority of the 
NMCs in CONUS. Those rates were used to determine the average handling cost for the 
busiest 2–4 NMCs in each region. These averages were used to develop the total handling 
rates for each possible source region and NMC destination. Table 10 depicts the handling 
rates (per ton) that were used for each NMC, broken down by source-of-supply. Included 
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in each rate is the individual handling rate for every Navy facility that would handle the 
ammunition, to include the final destination NMC. 
Table 10.   Handling Rates for Each NMC, Based on the Source of Supply for  
a Requisition. 
Source of Supply Cost per Ton Destination 
Resident Stock $136 
NMC EAST 
East (Local) Region $450 
Northwest Region $458 
Southeast Region $554 
West Region $1,124 
Source of Supply Cost per Ton Destination 
Resident Stock $60
NMC NW 




Source of Supply Cost per Ton Destination 
Resident Stock $101
NMC WEST 





For example, suppose the simulation assigns a requisition for NMC East to be 
fulfilled by a West Region NMC. The model multiplies the weight of the requisition by 
$1,124 (see Table 10) to determine the total handling charges that the Navy incurred for 
that requisition. Included in that $1,124 rate are the following other rates: 
 The average handling rate ($494) for the West Coast region is included 
because the ammunition supplied was originally sent to the West Coast by 
the Army to be used as West Coast inventory. 
 The average handling rate for the West Coast ($494) is included again 
because the NMC from the West Coast had to handle and prepare the 
ammunition a second time to send it to the East Coast. 
 The handling rate ($136) for NMC East is added because it had to handle 
the ammunition to receive it from the West Coast. 
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The resulting sum of the three rates is $1,124. This method of handling rate 
development was used to capture the systematic costs for the Navy for not positioning 
stock at the correct point-of-need the first time. In the model, the receiving NMC is 
assigned all prior handling charges for site-to-site shipments to capture the inefficiencies 
of site-to-site transfers and input a penalty for those inefficiencies. 
On a final note, two important assumptions that are in the model must be 
highlighted: (1) When the Army handles ammunition, it does not charge the Navy a 
handling cost and (2) an NMC incurs its own handling costs when it receives a return of 
ammunition from its customer. The Army does not currently charge handling costs now 
and that assumption is used throughout this entire project. The last point will be covered 
in the next section. 
b. Material Returns 
It is common practice for Navy customers to return unexpended ammunition after 
a deployment. In the status quo and decentralized systems, offloaded ammunition will 
either be given to other customers or put back in the NMC inventory. Either way, 
returned ammunition will incur handling charges for all systems, but in the centralized 
system it will also incur additional shipping charges because all returns will be shipped 
back to the Army. Instantly returning ammunition to the Army is an assumption that was 
agreed on with the sponsors (J. M. Bolig, personal communication, September 30, 2015), 
and it reflects how NMCs would serve as cross-docks in the centralized system. 
To capture all costs, it had to be determined or assumed how much ammunition 
was returned in the past. NAVSUP GLS AMMO provided the actual tonnage of 
ammunition returned to the subject NMCs in one specific year, and that amount was 
compared to the total tonnage that was requested in that same year. By analyzing what 
was returned in comparison to what was requested in total, it was possible to use a 
baseline return rate to estimate reality. It may not be an accurate rate across time, but it 
serves as the benchmark for returns in the model. Table 11 shows the return rates used in 
the model. 
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Table 11.   Ammunition Return Rates Used in the Simulation Model. 
2E 2T 
NMC EAST 54% 38%
NMC NW 61% 37%
NMC WEST 58% 54%
 
c. Shipping Rates 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO provided the estimated cost to ship one ton of 2E and 2T 
per mile. These costs were applied as constants, as per the expert opinion of NAVSUP 
GLS AMMO. In the model, it costs the Navy $0.40 and $1.66 to ship one ton of 2E and 
2T per mile, respectively (J. M. Bolig, personal communication, October 9, 2015). 
d. Holding Costs 
NAVSUP GLS AMMO provided the holding costs for each of the NMCs for one 
fiscal year. Table 12 shows the holding costs used for both COGs as a constant for the 
status quo system simulations. This is obviously an approximation; holding costs vary 
with shipments and inventories. For the purpose of this project this approximation was 
deemed sufficient. 






When simulating the centralized system, all holding costs are removed from the 
NMCs because (1) the NMCs would not hold inventory and (2) it is assumed that the 
Army would not charge the Navy a holding cost to centrally store the Navy’s ammunition 
(J. M. Bolig, personal communication, September 30, 2015). 
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When simulating the decentralized system, the holding cost is increased by the 
same percentage that the NMCs in question improve their first-pass effectiveness. The 
assumption is that any increase in first-pass effectiveness is due to more inventory being 
held at the NMC level. This is a conservative assumption, because it assumes the increase 
in safety stock is only what is actually needed for the performance that is attained (no 
extra safety stock because the system is decentralized). For simplicity, it is assumed that 
the increase in inventory will be proportionate to the increase in an NMC utilizing its 
resident stock. 
e. Setup Costs for the Centralized System 
To analyze the three NMCs under a centralized system, the model uses fixed set-
up costs provided by NAVSUP GLS AMMO. This cost is calculated based on the 
amount of inventory that would be re-positioned at the Army depot from each NMC. In 
the simulation, when the Navy and the Army agree to move to a centralized system, the 
ammunition stored by the Navy would be immediately returned to the Army for storage. 
All NMCs would serve as quasi cross-docks and thus have to forfeit all inventories to the 
Army immediately. The set-up costs would represent the shipping and handling costs that 
the Navy would incur by sending the ammunition back to the Army. The model uses the 
inventory levels provided by NAVSUP GLS to formulate shipping and handling costs to 
get the ammunition back to Crane, Indiana. No set-up costs are relevant in the other 
systems and the rationale will be explained further in the model design section. 
Table 13.   Set-Up Costs Used for Each NMC under the Centralized System. 
   NMC EAST NMC NW NMC WEST 
2E $2,264,640 $2,988,000 $65,058 
2T $2,499,720 $4,654,392 $10,262,694 
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D. MODEL DESIGN 
This section discusses the output of the model and its operation from step one 
through the final step. A Monte-Carlo simulation is used to generate demand, source of 
supply distribution, site-to-site source location and delivery performance. Embedded in 
the step-by-step descriptions are explanations of some of the policies that may have 
shaped the behavior of the model. 
1. The Output of the Model 
After the model runs one simulated year (one iteration), the output of the model 
is: 
 The distribution of net costs: when total costs of the centralized system are 
subtracted from the total costs of the status quo system for each COG. 
 The distribution of net costs: when the total costs of the decentralized 
system are subtracted from the total costs of the status quo system for each 
COG. 
 The distribution of net RDD success rates: when the RDD success rate for 
the status quo is subtracted from the centralized system RDD success rate 
for each COG. 
 The distribution of net RDD success rates: when the RDD success rate for 
the status quo is subtracted from the decentralized system’s RDD success 
rate for each COG. 
A positive net cost or positive net RDD success rate in either output indicates that 
the status quo system would be less costly and have an improved delivery performance. 
The model computes this output by calculating total cost and delivery performance for 
every NMC, under each system, for both COGs. A simulation of the net costs and net 
RDD success rate of the systems for each COG is run 10,000 times to provide a 
distribution of net costs and net RDD success rate at a 95% confidence level. 
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2. Sequence of Simulations and Calculations in the Model 
For simplicity, one COG model, performing one simulated year, is used to explain 
the sequence of the model. The model tests the three systems on each of the three NMCs 
under one COG by running thousands of one-year simulations to develop a confidence 
interval of simulated costs and delivery performance. In the subsequent Results chapter 
of this paper, the output of this model is revealed. 
a. Establishing Demand Levels 
The first step of the model is establishing the baseline demand by simulating the 
number of requisitions that each NMC will process that year. The baseline number and 
weight of requisitions will be different because each NMC has a different distribution for 
number and tonnage of requisitions. The statistics in Table 3 are used to feed the model 
to assign each NMC a quantity of requisitions via Monte-Carlo simulation. 
Once the number of requisitions is established, the model analyzes each requisition 
for each NMC and assigns a requisition tonnage based on each NMCs’ requisition tonnage 
distribution set by the statistics from Table 4. By the time the baseline demand is set for 
each NMC, the model will know each NMCs’ requisition quantities and tonnages. 
It is important that each system for each NMC to be measured on the same level 
of demand, so that costs can be compared side-by-side. Hence, common random numbers 
are used for each scenario. For one COG model, three different demand levels are 
automatically determined by the model for each NMC, but the same demand is applied to 
each scenario (they are run simultaneously). Every time a new year is simulated, new 
demand levels are determined for each NMC. Figure 5 gives a graphical explanation of 
how demand is constant for each NMC. 
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b. Source of Supply Determination 
This subsection discusses how the model determines the source for each 
requisition. Every requisition for an NMC is assigned a source of supply through a 
multilayered, Monte-Carlo simulation that is explained below. 
(1) The Overall Sourcing Probabilities that Influence the Model 
When a new year is simulated in a COG, each NMC is given a source of supply 
distribution based on the statistics that were discussed. Each NMC has a Monte-Carlo 
simulation that varies slightly for each system. The difference in the source of supply 
distributions across systems is whether or not the Army or the local NMC can serve as a 
source of supply. 
Using the status quo system as an example, the source of supply distribution 
produced through simulation will reveal the following rules of the model: 
 The probability that a requisition is supplied by the Army 
 The probability of a Navy-supplied requisition being fulfilled by the 
resident inventory of the NMC 
Once these variables are determined, the complements of these percentages 
implicitly reveal the probability of a requisition being sourced by the Navy as a whole, 
and the probability that a requisition sourced by the Navy would be supplied with a site-
to-site transfer. 
When the model simulates a centralized system for each NMC, the probability of 
each requisition being sourced by the Army is 100%, as it is the only location available to 
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supply requisitions. Under the decentralized system simulations, the probability of a 
requisition being supplied by the Army is 0% and a carefully considered percentage is 
injected into the model that determines the probability that an NMC can source its own 
requisitions. 
(2) Determining the Probability for Each Site-to-Site Source Location 
After the model determines the Army sourcing probability and the resident 
sourcing probability, the model generates another distribution that determines the 
probabilities of each site-to-site location being used as a source. The model was 
developed to determine site-to-site probabilities by using the distributions from all past 
site-to-site transfers depicted by the statistics in Table 7. This ensures that the site-to-site 
sources follow a similar pattern experienced in the last seven years. 
The model generates the probabilities of site-to-site locations so that 
cumulatively, all site-to-site location probabilities add up to 100%. To ensure this 
happens, the model was designed to take the difference in cumulative probabilities from 
100% and spread it proportionately across all site-to-site locations, adding or subtracting 
as necessary. Once the model determines that a requisition is sourced by a site-to-site 
transfer, the cumulative probabilities of all site-to-site locations must equal 100%. Simply 
determining the last location’s demand by subtracting from 100% would have created a 
correlation between demands, and would not have solved the problem of what to do when 
the initial sites totaled more than 100%. When the probabilities are proportionately 
adjusted, a correlation is not injected into the original simulation outputs. 
Table 14 depicts the steps the model takes once the Monte-Carlo simulation 
determines the assigned probabilities for site-to-site locations. Column two shows how 
the simulation provides unrefined, independent probabilities (in descending order) for 
each source of supply that do not necessarily add to 100%. Column three shows how the 
model automatically refines the probabilities by adding or subtracting proportional 
changes to each source of supply to have the probabilities all add up to 100%. The model 
then calculates the cumulative values of the probabilities (see column four, Table 14) and 
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then it creates probability intervals (see column five, Table 14). This process is repeated 
for every simulated year, for every NMC and every system.  
Table 14.   Example of How Site-to-Site Probabilities are Manipulated in the 













Regional 45.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0-50% 
West 22.50% 25.00% 75.00% 51%-75% 
Northwest 13.50% 15.00% 90.00% 76%-90% 
Southeast 9.00% 10.00% 100.00% 91%-100% 
Total 90.00% 100.00%   
 
For each requisition in the simulation, the following sequence of events occurs to 
determine the source of supply: 
 The model references the given probability of a requisition coming from the 
Army and generates a [0, 1] uniform random variable. If the random 
variable generated is less than or equal to the probability of the Army 
serving as a source of supply, then the model declares that requisition to be 
Army-sourced. If the random variable exceeds the probability of the Army 
serving as the source, the model determines the Navy to be the source of 
supply and moves on to the next step. 
 The model then generates another [0, 1] uniform random variable and 
compares it to the probability that an NMC will fulfill a requisition with its 
resident inventory. If the random variable generated is less than or equal to 
the probability of an NMC using its resident stock to fulfill a requisition, the 
model determines that the requisition was fulfilled by the NMC’s resident 
stock. If the random variable exceeds the probability of an NMC resident 
stock fulfillment, then the model determines that the particular requisition 
must be fulfilled by a site-to-site transfer and moves on to the next step. 
 The model then generates another uniform random variable between 0.00 
and 0.99 and compares it to the probability intervals of the site-to-site 
transfers (as in column five, Table 14). Regardless of what random variable 
is generated, it will fit within one of the assigned probability intervals 
generated by the model. Whichever corresponding interval the random 
variable lies within is the source of supply for that specific requisition. 
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The steps just mentioned are repeated for every requisition for each NMC under 
each system, with small changes to account for the different structures in the centralized 
and decentralized systems. For a centralized system, the first step automatically 
determines that all requisitions are sourced from the Army and no other steps are 
conducted. For the decentralized system, the first step automatically assumes that all 
requisitions are sourced from the Navy and the subsequent steps are the same as above, as 
site-to-site transfers are still possible. 
c. Determining Total Cost 
The previous steps determine the number of requisitions each NMC will process for 
each system, the size of each requisition (and thus the total tonnage), and the source of 
supply. The model is then ready to determine all the costs to operate the NMCs in each 
system. 
(1) Handling and Shipping Costs for Requisitions 
The model determines the total handling costs based on the rates listed in Table 
10. It automatically factors in the handling rates of the source and the NMC receiving the 
ammunition. Additionally, the model determines the shipping costs for each individual 
requisition. The shipping costs are calculated in the model by multiplying the shipping 
rates by the tonnage for that specific requisition and by the average distances between 
each region. Then, the cost to fulfill the requisitions for every NMC is known. The 
model, however, has not calculated the cost to handle returns and the set-up costs in a 
centralized system. 
(2) Holding Costs 
Holding costs vary between system types and NMCs. For the status quo system, 
the rates provided by NAVSUP GLS AMMO are used. For the centralized system, 
holding costs are assumed to be zero, as the Army is assuming all holding costs. For the 
decentralized system, holding costs are increased—from the status quo holding costs—by 
the difference in percentage that it sources more of its requisitions from its resident stock. 
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Using the NMC East model as an example, if the status quo system sources 50% 
of its Navy-supplied requisitions from resident stock and the decentralized system 
sources 80% of its Navy-supplied requisitions from the resident stock, then the holding 
costs are increased by 30% from the status quo holding costs (80%–50%) in the 
decentralized system. 
(3) Determining the Cost of Returns 
The model also estimates the percentage of ammunition that is returned to the NMC 
for each year. Based on a fixed percentage, the model determines how much shipping costs 
and handling costs have increased due to returns. For all three systems, the NMC incurs a 
handling cost for the operation of receiving the ammunition and/or sending it back to the 
Army. Either way, a customer return incurs the resident handling rate per ton for each 
NMC. In the centralized system, all ammunition offloaded returns to the Army depot and 
incurs shipping costs. All other systems do not incur a shipping fee for returns. 
(4) Determining Set-Up Costs 
In the centralized system, set-up costs are calculated into the total costs. The 
model automatically calculates the costs of repositioning the NMCs’ stockpiles to the 
inland Army depot using the shipping and handling rates provided by NAVSUP GLS 
AMMO. After set-up costs are calculated, the cost for each NMC to handle requisitions 
and returns under their respective systems can be determined. The model can now get the 
total costs for each NMC under each system. 
Set-up cost is not relevant in the decentralized system because it is assumed that 
no additional costs will be incurred to position stock at the coastal areas of CONUS. The 
model already accounts for the cost of shipping ammunition from the Army to the NMCs 
in the decentralized system. Even if the Army transferred a bulk of ammunition to the 
NMCs at the onset of the decentralize policy change, the movement of the ammunition 
would cost the same as if the ammunition was moved in smaller lots over a period of 
time. Essentially, the model captures the movement of ammunition from the Army to the 
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NMCs no matter when it moves and it costs no more than it does in the centralized and 
status quo systems. 
d. Determining Delivery Performance 
In the next step, the model determines how successful each NMC is at meeting its 
RDDs in each system. 
(1) Setting the Delivery Performance Baseline for the Year 
Using the statistics from Table 9, a Monte-Carlo simulation provides three 
variables for each NMC that represent the probability of RDD success for the year. The 
three separate metrics describe the probability of RDD success for (1) Army-sourced 
requisitions; (2) NMC, resident-inventory-fulfilled requisitions; and (3) Navy-fulfilled, 
site-to-site requisitions. These established benchmarks act as a guide for each sources’ 
delivery performance, but do not necessarily ensure that the actual requisitions will all 
average out to those RDD success probabilities. 
(2) Determining the Individual Required Delivery Date Success for Each 
Requisition 
Once the source of supply is identified for an individual requisition, the model 
references the corresponding RDD success rate set as a benchmark for that specific type 
of source of supply. The model then generates a [0, 1] uniform random variable. If the 
random variable is equal to or less than the probability of meeting the RDD for that 
particular type of source, the requisition is deemed to have met the RDD. If the random 
variable exceeds the probability of the RDD being met for that type of source, then the 
requisition is determined as having missed the RDD. This method allows the model to 
determine delivery performance fairly based on the past merits of each type of source in 
the last seven years. 
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e. Determining Net Cost and Net Required Delivery Date Success Rates 
The final step of the model is to take the total costs and RDD success rates of each 
system, and provide an output of net cost and net RDD success rate. This section describes 
how the model combines all that information to provide the net metrics for one year. 
(1) Determining the Net Costs 
Once the model has determined the total costs for each NMC under each system, 
it then determines the net costs for what it would cost the Navy to run different systems, 
compared to the status quo. The model takes the total costs of the centralized and 
decentralized systems separately and subtracts them from the total cost of the status quo 
system. 
For example, if the status quo system had a total cost of $1 million (M), the 
centralized system had a total cost of $2M, and the decentralized system had a total cost 
of $800,000. The centralized system would have a net cost of –$1M ($1M–$2M) and the 
decentralized system would have a net cost of +$200,000. A negative net cost for the 
centralized system indicates that the centralized system is more expensive to run under 
similar conditions and a positive net cost indicates that the decentralized system is 
cheaper. 
(2) Determining the Net Required Delivery Date Success Rates 
Conversely, the model takes the average RDD success rate from the status quo 
system and separately subtracts it from the decentralized and centralized system’s 
average RDD success rates. A negative net RDD success rate would indicate that the 
status quo’s delivery performance was better in comparison to the centralized or 
decentralized systems. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed how all the data was used in the model and how the model 
can provide the sponsors with cost and delivery performance comparisons at the COG 
level under the three different systems. A one-year COG simulation was used to walk 
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through the steps of the model and to describe how the model uses variability to simulate 
one year. The intention of this project is not to predict what actual costs and delivery 








This chapter discusses the results of the model simulation that was run for each 
system, the pertinent factors that influenced the results, and the observed changes in the 
results after conducting sensitivity analysis. This chapter also describes the average cost 
savings and delivery performance improvement for each system as well as the risk of cost 
increase or delivery performance degradation. 
B. RESULTS FROM THE MODEL 
For both the net cost and net RDD success rate, the averages are calculated with a 
95% confidence interval and, because 10,000 iterations were run for each simulation, a 
tight range of intervals can be provided for the means calculated. This information would 
help NAVSUP GLS AMMO see a realistic expected range of average cost savings and 
delivery performance improvement, based on the data provided. This chapter further 
explains how the intervals were calculated and what they mean. 
Because independent models were used for each COG, their results are discussed 
separately. The term “risk” will be used when describing the results. Risk is defined as 
the probability of experiencing increased cost or delivery performance degradation when 
converting to a decentralized or centralized system from the status quo system. The 
output of the model is a distribution of net cost and net RDD success rate for both COGs 
and both systems. The value at risk for each distribution is the percentage of the results 
below zero, which indicates the risk that the system would experience increased cost or 
degraded delivery performance when changed from the status quo. 
In determining the risk of cost increase, the output of the model is a distribution of 
the individual net difference of costs when the decentralized and centralized systems are 
each separately compared to the status quo system for one year. If the net difference of 
cost is positive for a particular system in a given year, it means that it would have saved 
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the Navy money to use the system being compared to the status quo. The model finds this 
net difference for 10,000 iterations/simulated years and outputs a distribution that 
determines the number of times, out of the 10,000 iterations, that the alternate stock 
positioning system costs more than the status quo system. This process helps reveal the 
probability that an alternate stock positioning system would cost more than the status quo 
and thus determine the level of cost risk that is involved with converting away from the 
status quo. The model conducts this process with both stock positioning systems, for both 
COGs. 
To determine the risk of delivery performance degradation, the metric net RDD 
success rate is used. Similarly to determining cost risk, the model individually compares 
the alternative systems’ RDD success rate for one year against the status quo success rate. 
The RDD success rates—expressed as a the percentage of the time that the RDDs are met 
by the sourcing activity—are compared against each other for one year and the result is a 
net RDD success rate distribution. If the value of the net RDD success rate is positive, 
then the RDD success rate would have been higher—by the stated percentage—if the 
stock positioning system being compared (decentralized or centralized) to the status quo 
was used instead. Again, the model conducts this process for 10,000 simulated years and 
develops a net RDD success rate distribution that reveals the probability that the net RDD 
success rate is negative and, thus, it will reveal the risk of having delivery performance 
degraded if the Navy switched to a decentralized or centralized system. 
First, the results of COG 2E are discussed, followed by the results of COG 2T. 
After describing the results of each COG, comparisons are made to identify the 
peculiarities of each COG’s behavior. To reclarify the metrics of the output, if any COG 
has a positive net cost or positive net RDD success rate in comparison to the status quo, it 
is considered superior in cost or delivery performance to the status quo. 
1. Cognizance 2E Results 
For COG 2E, this section describes the results of the centralized system, followed 
by the results of the decentralized system. 
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a. 2E Centralized System Results 
This subsection focuses on the cost and delivery performance results of the 
centralized system. 
(1) Cost 
According to the computations, the 95% confidence interval of the average cost 
savings from centralization is between $12,493,095 and $16,634,765. In other words, the 
method of computation—which is accurate 95% of the time—indicates that the average 
cost savings for the Navy will lie somewhere between $12,493,095 and $16,634,765 
under a centralized system. 
Overall, the model indicates that converting to a 2E centralized system would 
have a low risk of cost increase. After running 10,000 simulated years, the model 
determined that there is a 4.62% probability that a centralized system would cost more 
than the status quo system. That means the model estimates that 95.38% of the time (or 
9,538 out of 10,000 times) it will cost less to operate a centralized system. Figure 6 
depicts the output of the model and how the data is interpreted. The output in Figure 6 
represents the net costs distribution of 10,000 simulated iterations when converting to a 
centralized system. 




In Figure 6, the blue (the darker portion if viewed in black and white) portion of 
the distribution is the value at risk and represents the instances in the simulation where 
the centralized system costs more than the status quo; thus, the model’s output reveals a 
negative net cost. A negative net cost was the result 4.62% of time. In Figures 7 through 
13, the Certainty box at the bottom of the figure gives the relevant risk measure.  
(2) Delivery Performance  
The 95% confidence interval of the average delivery performance improvement 
lies between 3.77% and 3.91%. The model predicts that if the three NMCs were to 
convert 2E stock positioning to a centralized system, the 2E, as a whole, would, on 
average, improve delivery performance by a little less than 4%. As depicted by Figure 7, 
the model estimates that 84.68% of the time (or 8,468 out 10,000 times) a centralized 
system would result in better delivery performance than the status quo. 
Figure 7.  2E Distribution of Centralized System Net RDD Success Rates. 
 
 
b. 2E Decentralized System Results 
This subsection focuses on the cost and delivery performance results of the 
decentralized system. As mentioned earlier, for the decentralized system, it was assumed 
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that each NMC would have a first-pass effectiveness of 98%. This means that each NMC 
can source 98% of its requisitions with its resident stock. 
(1) Cost 
The 95% confidence interval of average cost savings from decentralization for the 
Navy lies between $112,509,759 and $116,078,853 if it converted the three NMCs to a 
decentralized system for this COG. After running 10,000 simulated years in the model, 
the output reveals that the 2E decentralized system never costs the Navy more than the 
status quo. Thus, the model estimates that the decentralized system virtually always costs 
less. As seen in Figure 8, the model predicts virtually no risk of cost increase. As 
mentioned in both Chapter III and V, this is to some degree an artifact of our model, 
which is using Navy expenditures as a surrogate for costs. The model predicts that Navy 
expenditures are almost certain to decline under a decentralized business model. 
Figure 8.  2E Distribution of Decentralized System Net Costs. 
 
 
(2) Delivery Performance 
The 95% confidence interval of the average delivery performance improvement 
from decentralization lies between –1.51% and –1.43%. This indicates that average 
delivery performance is expected to degrade by a little less than 1.5% if the stock 
positioning system is decentralized. As depicted by Figure 9, the model estimates that 
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24.78% of the time (or 2,478 out of 10,000 times) a decentralized system would result in 
better delivery performance than the status quo. 
Figure 9.  2E Distribution of Decentralized System Net RDD Success Rates. 
 
 
2. Cognizance 2T Results 
For COG 2T, this section describes the results of the centralized system, followed 
by the results of the decentralized system. 
a. 2T Centralized System Results 
This subsection focuses on the cost and delivery performance results of the 
centralized system. 
(1) Cost 
The 95% confidence interval of the average cost savings from centralization for 
the Navy lies between -$10,144,529 and -$8,190,723. The output of the model reveals 
that the 2T centralized system will have a 99.92% risk of cost increase from 
centralization, as depicted by Figure 10. This means that out of 10,000 simulations, 
almost all simulations indicated that the centralized system would be more expensive 
than the status quo. 
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Figure 10.  2T Distribution of Centralized System Net Costs. 
 
 
(2) Delivery Performance 
The 95% confidence interval of the average delivery performance improvement 
lies between 16.10% and 16.36%. On average, the centralized system is expected to 
perform better than the status quo. As depicted by Figure 11, the model estimates that 
99.89% of the time (or 9,989 out of 10,000 times) a centralized system would result in 
better delivery performance than the status quo. 




b. 2T Decentralized System Results 
This subsection focuses on the cost and delivery performance results of the 
decentralized system. As mentioned earlier, for the decentralized system, it was assumed 
that each NMC would have a first-pass effectiveness of 98%. This means that each NMC 
can source 98% of its requisitions with its resident stock. 
(1) Cost 
The output of the model showed that a 2T decentralized system would cost less 
than the status quo system 100% of the time. The 95% confidence interval of average 
cost savings from decentralization for the Navy lies between $37,350,969 and 
$39,084,655. Figure 12 depicts the distribution of 2T Decentralized Net Costs. 
Figure 12.  2T Distribution of Decentralized System Net Costs. 
 
 
(2) Delivery Performance 
The 95% confidence interval of the average delivery performance improvement 
from decentralization lies between –3.77% and –3.69%. On average, the decentralized 
system is expected to perform worse than the status quo. As depicted by Figure 13, the 
model estimates that 2.6% of the time (or 260 out of 10,000 times) a centralized system 
would result in better delivery performance than the status quo. 
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Figure 13.  2T Distribution of Decentralized System Net RDD Success Rates. 
 
 
The Navy’s recorded history of relatively ineffective delivery performance (which 
may in part be an artifact of the way the data are captured, as explained in Chapter V) is 
reflected in the difference in RDD success between the status quo, and a decentralized 
system that would use the Navy system even more heavily. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
1. Testing the Bounds of our Assumption 
A constraint in the model is that the decentralized system would have a first-pass 
effectiveness rate of 98%. Thus, far, the results for COGs 2E and 2T have both shown 
that the decentralized system to be the least costly option by a wide margin. This, 
however, may be due to the generous assumption that the each NMC would fulfill 
customers’ requests with their resident stock 98% of the time. This sensitivity analysis 
tests the limits of the first-pass effectiveness rate in the decentralized system. The 
objective is to see how low the first-pass rate could go for the three NMCs before the 
decentralized system no longer has the lowest average total cost, and how the delivery 
performance would be affected by the increase of site-to-site transfers. 
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2. Method 
In order to find the threshold where the decentralized system no longer had the 
lowest average total cost, multiple simulations were run in which the first-pass 
effectiveness statistic was lowered by 10% increments for each NMC and run through 
10,000 iterations until the point was reached where the decentralized system was no 
longer the low cost system. From there, first-pass effectiveness was increased marginally 
to find the nearest value lower than the best cost option. The first simulation for both 2E 
and 2T reduced first-pass effectiveness to 90% from the original 98% assumption. 
The intent was to test the limits of the decentralized system to see how badly it 
can perform—with regard to stock positioning decisions—and still be the best cost option 
to reduce the Navy’s operating costs. This analysis reveals how much room there is for 
error in the misallocation of initial inventory for each NMC. 
As first-pass effectiveness is reduced, all other parameters are held constant, so 
that results are comparable. Because the data shows that the Navy has a better delivery 
performance with site-to-site transfers than delivery performance from on-site inventory, 
it was expected that the delivery performance will improve when a decentralized system 
relies more on site-to-site transfers with lower first-pass effectiveness. 
3. Sensitivity Results 
This section describes the results of the sensitivity analysis separately by COG, 
starting with COG 2E. 
a. COG 2E Sensitivity Results 
This subsection describes the results of cost and delivery performance for COG 
2E. Cost results are described using average total costs for the simulations and delivery 




(1) Cost Results 
According to the additional simulations that were run, when each of the three 
NMCs of the 2E decentralized COG has a first-pass effectiveness of approximately 62%, 
it will no longer be the lowest cost option and the centralized system becomes the better 
option in terms of cost. Figure 14 visually depicts what happens to the total and 
individual costs when the decentralized system has to rely on more site-to-site transfers. 
Figure 14.  Cost Breakdowns for COG 2E Systems, Compared to the 
Decentralized System Under Varying First-Pass Effectiveness Rates. 
 
 
A lower first-pass effectiveness rate means that more site-to-site transfers occur 
because the resident inventory cannot support local orders as effectively. Set-up costs are 
not displayed, but are factored into the total costs of the centralized system. 
At the top of Figure 14, it can be seen that with each NMC fulfilling 70% of its 
orders on the first-pass (from resident inventory), the average total costs are still lower 
than the centralized and status quo systems. This would allow the Navy some leeway 
with COG 2E crossover challenges if it were to transition to a decentralized system. The 
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model indicates that COG 2E can have over 30% of it orders sourced by site-to-site 
transfers and that the Navy would still save money. Looking at Table 6 in Section III.C.5, 
in the past seven years, no NMC has had first-pass effectiveness lower than 77%; thus, no 
NMC has had to rely on that many site-to-site transfers under the status quo system. 
Due to holding cost assumptions explained in Section III.C.8.d, it is clear that 
holding costs decline in Figure 14, when the first-pass effectiveness rate declines. 
Shipping and handling costs, however, start to creep up with increased site-to-site 
transfers and the total cost exceeds the total cost of the centralized system at about 62% 
first-pass effectiveness. Once again, this reveals the notion that improperly positioning 
stockpiles away from its point-of-need, costs the Navy a lot of money. 
(2) Delivery Performance Results 
As expected, the model depicts that the average net RDD success rate will 
increase when more ammunition is supplied to the NMCs by site-to-site transfers. Table 
15 shows that the average net RDD success rate starts to develop a net gain at around 
65% for first-pass effectiveness. This solidifies the pattern that has been established in the 
data and the model. 
Table 15.   2E Decentralized: Average Net RDD Success Rate Under Varying 





Average Net RDD 
Success Rate 
90% 26,071 –1.07% 
80% 52,031 –0.64% 
70% 78,150 –0.22% 
60% 104,465 0.18% 
50% 130,542 0.66% 
40% 156,272 1.06% 
b. COG 2T Sensitivity Results 
This subsection describes the results of cost and delivery performance for COG 
2T. Cost results are described using average total costs for the simulations and delivery 
performance results are described using average net RDD success rate percentage. 
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(1) Cost Results 
As seen in Figure 15, once the NMCs of the 2T decentralized system start to reach 
about 60% first-pass effectiveness, decentralization is no longer the low cost alternative 
to the status quo system. The status quo system starts to become more cost effective by 
over $1M at the 60% first-pass level. Similar to the 2E decentralized system, the 2T 
decentralized system can operate with 30% of its orders being provided by site-to-site 
transfers and still be less costly than the other alternatives. Again, this may provide the 
Navy with hefty room for error if the decision is made to convert to a decentralized 
system. 
Figure 15.  Cost Breakdowns for COG 2T Stock-Positioning Systems, 




(2) Delivery Performance Results 
Similar to the 2E performance sensitivity analysis, Table 16 shows that the 
average net RDD success rate goes up as first-pass effectiveness declines. The 2T 
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average net RDD success rate, however, becomes a positive percentage much sooner than 
2E. Positive net RDD performance occurs at about a 72% first-pass effectiveness rate. 
This shows that each COG has its own individual characteristics and that one rule, for 
one COG, might not apply to another because all the key variables that affect cost and 
performance are different. 
Table 16.   2T Decentralized: Average Net RDD Success Rate Under Varying 





Average Net RDD 
Success Rate 
90% 6,133 –1.23% 
80% 12,288 –1.02% 
70% 18,399 0.41% 
60% 36,825 1.87% 
50% 30,706 3.37% 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter summarizes the results of the model, underlying limitations, and 
assumptions made. Following that, this chapter discusses the recommendations for stock 
positioning based off of the output of the model. Finally, this project concludes with 
recommendations for future analysis that will hopefully strengthen this area of research. 
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
As seen in Table 17, the decentralized system would have a higher average cost 
savings and little-to-no risk of cost increase for both COGs; however, it appears that 
decentralizing the ammunition stockpiles would have a lower average delivery 
performance improvement with a high risk of delivery performance degradation. 
Centralizing, on the other hand, had conflicting results, as centralizing COG 2E would 
have a lower average cost savings and high risk of cost increase, as well as a higher 
average delivery performance improvement with a low risk of delivery performance 
degradation. 
Table 17.   Summary of Results for COGs 2E and 2T. 
COG System Cost Risk 
95% Confidence Interval:








2E Centralized 4.62% $12,493,095 to $16,634,765 15.32% 3.77% to 3.91%
2E Decentralized 0% $112,509,759 to $116,078,853 75.22% –1.51% to –1.43%
2T Centralized 100% -$10,144,529 to -$8,190,723 0.11% 16.10% to 16.36%
2T Decentralized 0% $37,350,969 to $39,084,655 97.40% –3.77% to –3.69%
Summary of net costs and net delivery performance risk when each system is compared 
to the status quo within its perspective COGs. 
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1. Analysis of Cost Results 
Looking at the stock positioning system strictly regarding costs, the optimal 
system to use is the one that minimizes holding, handling, shipping, and set-up costs. Any 
attempt to minimize one type of cost, however, seems to have an inverse effect on 
another cost. Ultimately, this balancing act of the aforementioned costs in the 
ammunition supply chain is what is analyzed. In the model, the different systems 
represent opportunities to minimize one type of cost at the expense of another cost in the 
following manner: 
 Centralized system: The Navy technically eliminates holding costs 
(because the costs move to another budget), but then incurs set-up costs and 
increased shipping costs from material returns. With the centralized system, 
handling costs are greatly reduced by the elimination of site-to-site 
transfers. 
 Decentralized system: An attempt to decrease handling costs by increasing 
first-pass effectiveness and, thus, decreasing site-to-site transfers. This 
method incurs greater holding costs, as more inventory is held at the NMCs. 
 Status quo: A possible middle-ground attempt to balance control of 
inventory, readiness, and costs. 
Subsections (1) and (2) break down the different costs for each system to reveal 
the factors that influenced net costs. 
a. Analysis of Cognizance 2E Costs 
This subsection analyzes the handling, set-up, shipping, and holding costs for 
each stock positioning system of COG 2E using the mean/average output values of each 
cost category, which were a result of the 10,000 simulations conducted by the model. 
Average values are used to find relative values for each cost to conduct comparisons for 
each cost category. 
As seen in Figure 16 and in earlier results, 2E status quo had the highest average 
total costs among all three stock positioning systems. This is because it had the highest 
handling costs and almost the highest shipping costs, which is explained by the fact that 
under the status quo system, site-to-site transfers happen more often than with any other 
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stock positioning systems. The decentralized system is the only other system that depends 
on site-to-site transfers, but they occur less frequently than with the status quo system. In 
the 2E status quo system, the average amount of tons transported in site-to-site transfers 
in one year was 26,060 tons. The decentralized system transferred an average of 5,227 
tons from site-to-site and, thus, the decentralized system had significantly lower shipping 
and handling costs than the status quo system. 




In any system, shipping and handling costs rise significantly when specific 
ammunition is not positioned where it is needed. When ammunition takes an indirect 
route to its final destination, it is a waste of resources; in other words, site-to-site 
transfers are a waste of resources. The centralized system, as displayed in Figure 16, has 
high shipping and handling costs due to the returns that were factored into the model. The 
model factors in all the shipments and returns back to the Army. On average, the 2E 
centralized system processed 152,577 tons of returns back to the Army because the 
NMCs were not allowed to hold any inventory. So, again, extra shipping and handling 
costs are being incurred to ship ammunition back to the Army. This seems like a total 
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waste of resources, but it should be highlighted that the 2E centralized system still costs 
less, with its higher tonnage of returns than the status quo system and its site-to-site 
transfers. 
Site-to-site transfers seem more costly to a 2E supply chain than returns in a 
centralized system. One explanation might be because handling costs are lower with 
returns. The Army does not charge the Navy handling costs for order fulfillments and 
returns. Site-to-site transfers incur additional handling costs to the Navy at every stop. So 
theoretically, a point-to-point return from an NMC to the Army can travel the exact same 
distance as a site-to-site transfer, but because a site-to-site transfer in total has at least one 
connecting destination, it incurs at least two installation-handling fees, whereas a return 
only incurs one Navy installation handling fee for the bundling and shipping of the 
return. With 2E, the shipping costs are, on average, almost the same between the 
centralized and status quo, but the average centralized handling costs are almost $15M 
lower and, thus, the 2E centralized system was cheaper than the 2E status quo system. 
In the end, the decentralized system is the most cost-effective system for COG 
2E. Figure 16 shows that even though it had, on average, $786,667 in higher holding 
costs than the status quo, it had, on average, $115,008,605 less in combined handling and 
shipping costs. When using a decentralized system, there seems to be a disproportionate 
yet, favorable, trade-off between additional holding costs and the reduction of handling 
and shipping costs. 
b. Analysis of Cognizance 2T Costs 
In the 2T supply chain (see Figure 17), the centralized system is much more 










The main difference between the 2E supply chain and the 2T supply chain is that 
the average set-up costs and the average shipping costs combine to make the centralized 
system more costly than the status quo system. In the 2T centralized system, the average 
shipping costs are a little higher in comparison to the 2T status quo shipping costs, but 
are still within $13M of each other. Since 2T has different demand patterns, shipping 
rates, and rates of return compared to COG 2E, the cost relationship between stock 
positioning systems will vary. This explains why the centralized system is cheaper than 
the status quo for 2E. 
The model reveals that decentralizing the stockpiles has the lowest risk of cost 
increase and the most possible cost benefit in COG 2E despite it having the highest 
holding costs. The decentralized system again has the lowest average shipping costs 
because it has to rely on site-to-site transfers very few times and it does not return 
offloads back to the Army. In the 2T supply chain, the decentralized system site-to-site 
transferred an average of 1,228 tons, the status quo system transferred an average of 
5,089 tons and the centralized system was required to return, on average, 21,894 tons of 
offloaded ammunition back to the Army. 
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2. Analysis of Delivery Performance Results 
To understand why the model always finds the centralized system to have low 
risk of delivery performance degradation and the decentralized systems to have a high 
risk of delivery performance degradation, one only needs to look at the historical RDD 
success rates in Table 9 of Section III.C.7. Almost all the RDD success rates for each 
NMC reveal that the Army (the centralized source) has the highest average RDD success 
rate. The notion that the Navy’s delivery performance decreases as first-pass 
effectiveness increases is counterintuitive and indicates that the data may be unreliable. 
This project did not involve investigating why resident-sourced delivery 
performance is worse. It can be assumed that the LMS personnel are more focused on the 
high-visibility, intricate orders that have to be sourced by the Army or through site-to-site 
transfers. Thus, the personnel are more diligent in seeing those complicated, site-to-site 
transfers through to the last step—which occurs when the customer administratively 
receipts for the ammunition on OIS-R—to ensure that all the moving pieces came 
together. It is possible that when LMS personnel know a requisition is going to be 
fulfilled by resident stock of the NMC, it quickly falls off their radar and, consequently, 
they are not as forceful in ensuring that the customer receipts for the ammunition on or 
before the RDD. 
Possibly, a decentralized system would have the opposite effect of what the model 
predicts; which is a high risk of delivery performance degradation. As mentioned before, 
the RDD success rates were reflective of the data provided by NAVSUP GLS AMMO 
and were not manipulated to be in favor of any system based on the assumption that stock 
positioned closer to demand would result in more favorable delivery performance. 
Section C discusses some of the limitations of the data and why it may be possible that a 
decentralized system’s delivery performance would not be as low as the model estimates. 
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C. LIMITATIONS 
This section covers some of the issues with the data provided, and with model 
assumptions necessary because of data availability or time restrictions, which limit the 
generalization and implications of the results. 
1. Time-Stamped Data 
The NMC personnel can choose to process a specific order when they deem it 
necessary, based on the priority of the order, the RDD, and the current requirements of 
other orders. Additionally, the time that a material receipt confirmation is dated in OIS 
may not show when the actual ammunition was receipted; it only indicates when the 
administrative process of inputting the material receipt confirmation took place. 
The inherent weakness in the data is the use of time-stamped transactional data. It 
is a prediction that not all requisitions deemed “late” were actually late. There is a 
possibility that many requisitions were marked not meeting the RDD because it was 
stamped (receipted-for) long after the order was received, post-RDD. Following up on 
this intuition, which would have required auditing a significant sample of late orders and 
confirming with personnel if, in fact, the samples were late, went beyond the scope and 
time frame of this project. 
As mentioned earlier, there may not be as much urgency placed on customers to 
quickly indicate in the supply system that they received their requisition before the RDD. 
This can be especially true if there is a lot of ammunition to count and verify, or if an 
order was received right before a period of liberty. NAVSUP’s data makes it very 
difficult to use in any detailed analysis, unless every organization in the supply chain is 
administratively inputting time stamps closely to when the corresponding actions 
occurred. It is somewhat futile to measure the success of NAVSUP GLS AMMO by the 
delivery performance standard if the data used to dictate success or failure is inaccurate 
by nature. 
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2. Transportation Capacity 
Within the model, some sweeping assumptions were made about the capacity of 
transportation assets for both the Army and the Navy. This project did not capture the 
effects that increased shipments would have on the transportation assets of the Army and 
Navy, and, therefore, it did not factor in how lead times would increase because shipping 
capacity would be strained. There was not enough information about the capacities of the 
transportation assets and it went beyond the scope of this project. 
It may be worth mentioning that if a decentralized system is to be implemented, 
the Navy should be prepared to increase the capacity of shipping assets, if necessary. 
Likewise, if a centralized system were to be implemented, the Navy would need to factor 
in the increased transportation costs for returns and expect the Army to pass on some of 
their transportation costs. 
3. Shipment Sizes 
In this project, it was assumed that the number of shipments would be 
independent of the size of the orders. In a supply chain system, it may be a natural 
occurrence for the sizes of orders to increase if the total amount of shipments for the year 
decreased. This project ignored this phenomenon and treated order sizes and tonnage of 
shipments as independent variables. This was done to replicate the order sizes that 
individual units demand and to replicate an individual unit’s lack of concern for 
economies-of-scale when ordering their own requirements. 
4. Shipment Times with Regard to Tonnage 
Another assumption that was made in this project was that the tonnage of orders 
did not have any effect on their response time or the probability that they would or would 
not meet their RDD. Unfortunately, this type of analysis was well beyond the scope and 
time bounds that were available, but there may be an interest in seeing if there is a 
correlation between tonnage and logistics response time. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE OUTPUT OF THE MODEL 
It is recommended that the Navy explore decentralization of its ammunition 
stockpiles on an incremental basis to observe the effects with the different COGs. The 
output of the model indicates that the shipping cost is the lowest for a decentralized 
system. This could imply that the decentralized system may provide cost savings for 
those COGs that experience high shipping costs in the status quo. 
Since every COG has unique demand, shipping, and cost patterns, it is 
recommended that every COG be given individual consideration before committing to 
decentralization. The different characteristics of each COG will prevent a one-size-fits-all 
model from determining decentralization feasibility for all; therefore, it is recommended 
that a similar methodology to the one used in this project be utilized. 
From a cost risk standpoint, it appears that decentralization has the lowest risk of 
cost increase for both COGs. Since the sensitivity analysis demonstrated that significant 
reliance on site-to-site transfers with a decrease in first-pass effectiveness is still cost 
effective, there would be less pressure to initially forecast the right amounts of inventory 
to give to each NMC. 
Because of the limitations of time-stamped data that were discussed previously, it 
is recommended that the Navy analyze its current business process associated with 
receipt transactions to determine if a kaizen event can be coordinated to improve the 
accuracy of this process. Without data that is reflective of actual events, it is difficult to 
measure actual delivery performance and it may be impractical to predict the behavior of 
a system with inaccurate data. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is recommended that the following topics be explored further: 
 The effects of decentralization and centralization on other COGs using 
additional years of data 
 Refined analysis into the effects of order size and RDD success 
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 Refined analysis into what the actual delivery performance is of the Navy 
under current administrative behaviors 
 Analysis of transportation capacities that would be required for 
decentralization 
 The effects of using real-time tracking technology in the Navy ammunition 
supply chain 
 65
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Askin, R. G., Baffo, I., & Xia, M. (2014). Multi-commodity warehouse location and 
distribution planning with inventory consideration. International Journal of 
Production Research, 52(7), 1897–1910. doi:10.1080/00207543.2013.787171 
Department of Defense. (2008). Single manager for conventional ammunition (SMCA) 
(DOD Directive 5160.65). Washington, DC: Author. 
Department of Defense. (2011). DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy (DOD 
Instruction 4140.01). Washington, DC: Author. 
Guiffrida, A. L., Jaber, M. Y., & Rzepka, R. A. (2008). An economic model for justifying 
the reduction of delivery variance in an integrated supply chain. Infor, 46(2), 147–
153. 
Hanghøj, A. (2015). The impact of purchasing capabilities on delivery performance. 
Supply Chain Forum: International Journal, 16(1), 14–25.  
Keller, G. (Ed.). (2009). Statistics for management and economics (8th ed.). Mason, OH: 
South-Western Cengage Learning, 340. 
Navy Supply Systems Command. (2015). Conventional ordnance stockpile management 
policies and procedures (NAVSUP P-724). (21 ed.). Mechanicsburg, PA: Author. 
Oswald, A., Atkinson, M., & Ferrer, G. (2015). Measuring the impact of business rules 
on inventory balancing. Unpublished manuscript. 
Peltz, E., Girardini, K., Robbins, M., & Boren, P. (2008). Effectively sustaining forces 
overseas while minimizing supply chain costs. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation. 
Shahabi, M., Akbarinasaji, S., Unnikrishnan, A., & James, R. (2013). Integrated 
inventory control and facility location decisions in a multi-echelon supply chain 
network with hubs. Networks & Spatial Economics, 13(4), 497–514. 
doi:10.1007/s11067-013-9196-4 
Sherbrooke, C. C. (1968). Metric: A multi-echelon technique for recoverable item 
control. Operations Research, 16(1), 122. 
Soepenberg, G. D., Land, M. J., & Gaalman, G. J. C. (2012). A framework for diagnosing 
the delivery reliability performance of make-to-order companies. International 
Journal of Production Research, 50(19), 5491–5507. 
doi:10.1080/00207543.2011.643251 
 66
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
